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A Secure and Efficient ID-Based Aggregate
Signature Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks
Limin Shen, Jianfeng Ma, Member, IEEE, Ximeng Liu, Member, IEEE, Fushan Wei, and Meixia Miao
Abstract—Affording secure and efficient big data aggregation
methods is very attractive in the field of wireless sensor net-
works (WSNs) research. In real settings, the WSNs have been
broadly applied, such as target tracking and environment remote
monitoring. However, data can be easily compromised by a vast
of attacks, such as data interception and data tampering, etc. In
this paper, we mainly focus on data integrity protection, give an
identity-based aggregate signature (IBAS) scheme with a desig-
nated verifier for WSNs. According to the advantage of aggregate
signatures, our scheme not only can keep data integrity, but also
can reduce bandwidth and storage cost for WSNs. Furthermore,
the security of our IBAS scheme is rigorously presented based on
the computational Diffie–Hellman assumption in random oracle
model.
Index Terms—Aggregate signature, big data, coalition attack,
data aggregation, designated verifier, identity-based (ID-based),
unforgeability, wireless sensor network (WSN).
I. INTRODUCTION
IN BIG data era, digital universe grows in stunning speedwhich is produced by emerging new services, such as social
network [1], [2], cloud computing [3]–[8], and Internet of
things [9], [10]. Big data are gathered by omnipresent wire-
less sensor networks (WSNs), aerial sensory technologies,
software logs, information-sensing mobile devices, micro-
phones, cameras, etc. [11]. And the WSN is one of the highly
anticipated key contributors of the big data in the future
networks [12].
WSNs, with a large number of cheap, small, and highly
constrained sensor nodes sense the physical world [13], has
very broad application prospects [14] both in military and
civilian usage, including military target tracking and surveil-
lance [15], animal habitats monitoring [16], biomedical health
monitoring [17], [18], and critical facilities tracking [19]. It can
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be used in some hazard environments, such as in nuclear
power plants. Due to the remarkable advantages, comprehen-
sive attention has been devoted to WSNs [20], and a number
of schemes have been presented [21]–[25]. In WSNs, sen-
sor nodes are usually resource-limited and power-constrained,
they always suffer from the restricted storage and process-
ing resources. Therefore, different from traditional networks,
WSNs have their inherent resource constraints and design lim-
itations, such as low bandwidth, short communication range,
limited amount of energy, and limited processing and storage
in every sensor node. Data aggregation technique is consid-
ered as a Holy Grail to reduce energy consumption for WSNs.
However, the technique still has the inherent security prob-
lems, such as eavesdropping, reply attacks, data forge and
data tampering, etc. Hence, designing a secure and efficient
data aggregation method is very significant for WSNs.
In 1984, Shamir [26] introduced the identity-based (ID-
based) cryptography, which eases the key management prob-
lem by eliminating public key certificates. In an ID-based
cryptography, the user’s public key is easily generated from
this user’s any unique identity information (e.g., the serial
number, a mobile phone number, an email address, etc.), which
is assumed to be publicly known. A trusted third party, called
the private key generator (PKG), generates and issues secretly
the corresponding private keys for all users using a master
secret key. Therefore, in an ID-based signature system, verifi-
cation algorithm only involves the signature pair, some public
parameters and the identity information of signer, without
using an additional certificate.
In 2003, Boneh et al. [27] introduced an aggregate signature
scheme, which can compress multiple signatures generated
by different users on different messages into a single short
aggregate signature. The aggregate signature’s validity can
be equivalent to the validity of every signature which is
used to generate the aggregate signature. That is to say, the
aggregate signature is validity if and only if each individual
signer really signed its original message, respectively. Hence,
aggregation is useful technique in reducing storage cost and
bandwidth, and can be a decisive building block in some
settings, such as data aggregation for WSNs [22], securing
border gateway protocols [28] and large scale electronic voting
system [29], etc.
In this paper, combining the highlights of aggregate signa-
ture scheme and ID-based cryptography, we give an ID-based
aggregate signature (IBAS) scheme for WSNs in cluster-based
method (Fig. 1). The adversary in our security model has the
capability to launch any coalition attacks. If an adversary can
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Fig. 1. Cluster-based network.
use some single signatures including invalid ones to generate a
valid aggregate signature, we say that the attack is successful.
In fact, our IBAS scheme not only can protect data integrity,
but also can reduce bandwidth and storage cost for WSNs.
The main contributions of this paper are fourfold.
1) First, we give the system model which have three com-
ponents: a) data center; b) aggregator; and c) a large
number of sensor nodes. Aggregator works as a cluster
head, can produce the aggregate signature and send it
to the data center with the messages generated by the
sensor nodes. Then, through a game played with a chal-
lenger and an adversary, the security model of IBAS
schemes is introduced. And in the security model, the
aggregation algorithm should resist all kinds of coalition
attacks.
2) Second, we give a secure IBAS scheme for WSNs
with a designated verifier (data center). Our scheme is
composed of six probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
algorithms: a) setup; b) KeyGeneration; c) signing;
d) verification; e) aggregation; and f) AggVerification.
3) Third, the detailed security proof is given based on
the computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) assumption in
random oracle model. The security proof indicates that
our IBAS scheme for WSNs can ensure the integrity of
the data and reduce the communication and storage cost.
4) Fourth, through the analysis of comparative perfor-
mance, we demonstrate that our IBAS scheme is efficient
in terms of the communication and storage overhead.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the follow-
ing section, we introduce some related work about aggregate
signature schemes. In Section III, we give some preliminaries
demanded in this paper, including bilinear pairing and com-
plexity assumptions. Section IV presents the system model
and security model of IBAS schemes. Our IBAS scheme is
presented in Section V. In Section VI, we present a detailed
security proof of our scheme based on the CDH assumption,
and some observation of our new scheme. In Section VII, we
analyze the performance of our IBAS scheme in terms of com-
munication and computation cost. Finally, Section VIII is the
conclusions.
Fig. 2. IBAS scheme.
II. RELATED WORK
The aggregate signature scheme can generate a compressed
signature from many signatures generated by different users
on different messages. Boneh et al. [27] introduced the con-
cept and structure of aggregate signature schemes in 2003.
After that, many aggregate signature schemes have been pre-
sented [30]–[33]. However, there still exist a lot of problems
in the above schemes. In traditional public key infrastructures
(PKIs), the user’s public key is not related to the user’s identity
information, in fact, it is a “random” string. So there needs a
trusted certificate authority to generate certificates which can
ensure the relationship between the user and the cryptographic
keys. This improves the communication overhead, computa-
tion and storage cost and would influence the efficiency of
the aggregate signature scheme. ID-based cryptography [26]
solved these problems. In an ID-based cryptography, the user’s
public key is any publicly known and unique identity informa-
tion, such as the serial number, and the user no longer needs
a certificate to prove its identity.
Since then, many IBAS schemes (Fig. 2) have been pre-
sented [34]–[37]. Up to now, a great many aggregate signa-
ture schemes have rapidly emerged in various settings, such
as [38] and [39] in PKIs and [40]–[44] in certificateless pub-
lic key cryptography, respectively. Both [43] and [45] show
security drawbacks of the certificateless aggregate signature
scheme in [42] by demonstrating some kinds of attacks.
Unfortunately, most of the existing aggregate signature
schemes cannot resist a kind of practical and powerful
attacks—coalition attacks [43], [46], [47]. Coalition attack can
generate a valid aggregate signature by using some invalid
single signatures with the collusion of two or more signers.
If such an attack is successful, the corresponding aggregate
signature will pass the validation while some single signa-
tures used to generate it are invalid. This suggests that a valid
aggregate signature may fail to prove the validity of every
individual signature involved in the aggregation. This fact
obviously violates the security goal for aggregate signature
schemes. So, in this paper, we will mainly focus on design-
ing the aggregate signature scheme which can resist coalition
attacks.
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III. PRELIMINARIES
The following is some basic notions required in this paper,
containing the definition of bilinear pairing, the CDH com-
plexity assumption.
A. Bilinear Pairing
Let G and K denote two cyclic groups whose orders are
both prime p. Let P be a generator in G and |G| = |K|. A map
eˆ : G × G → K is called a bilinear pairing if it satisfies the
following properties.
1) Bilinearity: For all Q1, Q2 ∈ G and τ, υ ∈ Z∗p ,
eˆ(τQ1, υQ2) = eˆ(Q1, Q2)τυ .
2) Nondegeneracy: eˆ(P, P) = 1K , where 1K is the identity
element of K.
3) Computability: For all P1, P2 ∈ G, there exits an
efficient algorithm to compute eˆ(P1, P2).
B. Complexity Assumptions
This section revisits the CDH complexity assumption [35]
needed in the following sections.
Definition 1 (CDH Problem): Given the elements
P, τP, υP ∈ G, to compute τυP ∈ G for unknown
randomly chosen τ, υ ∈ Z∗p .
The CDH assumption states that the CDH problem is hard.
Let A be a CDH attacker. A’s advantage to solve the CDH
problem in G is defined as
AdvCDHA = Pr
[
A(P, τP, υP) = τυP : τ, υ ∈ Z∗p
]
.
Here the probability is over the uniform random scalars τ and
υ from Z∗p , and the choice of P ∈ G, and the coin tosses of A.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY MODEL
A. System Model
Security requirements in WSNs mainly are confidentiality,
integrity, authenticity, scalability and flexibility, etc. In a data
aggregation scheme for WSNs, it is important that no data
falsify during transmissions. So we mainly focus on the data
integrity protection in our system. The main consideration of
our system model is to protect data integrity while reducing
bandwidth and storage cost for WSNs.
Our IBAS system consists of three parts (Fig. 3): 1) data
center; 2) aggregator; and 3) sensor node.
1) Data center has a strong computing power and storage
space. So it can process all original big data collected
by sensor nodes belong to the data center, and can
provide the data information to consumers. At the begin-
ning, every data center (as the designated verifier in
our IBAS scheme) will receive its public-secret key pair
(PKcenter, SKcenter), and publish the public key PKcenter.
2) Aggregator is a special sensor node with a certain
ability to calculation and communication range. It can
sign messages collecting from the physical world, can
get the data center’s public key PKcenter from public
channel, can generate the aggregate signature from the
individual signatures signed by sensor nodes included
aggregator itself, and can send the aggregate signature
Fig. 3. Our system.
to the data center. We assume that the PKG generates
the system parameters param, aggregator’s private key
SID corresponding to its identifier information ID, then
embeds (param, SID) in aggregator when it is deployed.
3) Sensor node has limited resources in terms of compu-
tation, memory, and battery power. We assume that the
PKG generates private key SIDi for each sensor node
IDi. When sensor node IDi is deployed, it is embed-
ded with (param, SIDi). Every sensor node IDi can use
its private key SIDi to sign messages collecting from the
physical world. In our system, each sensor node belongs
to one cluster, sends messages and its signatures to their
aggregator, and the messages will finally be sent to data
center via aggregator.
B. Security Model of IBAS
An IBAS scheme is comprised of six PPT algorithms:
1) setup; 2) KeyGeneration; 3) signing; 4) verification;
5) aggregation; and 6) AggVerification. Please refer to [37]
for the detailed instruction.
Obviously, the goal of an adversary is the existential forgery
of an aggregate signature. An IBAS scheme is secure if
the basic signature scheme involved is existentially unfor-
gettable against adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA
secure [48]), and the aggregation algorithm should stand up
against all kinds of coalition attacks. Most of the former secu-
rity models only consider the security of the basic signature
scheme and the forgery of an aggregate signature, and do
not consider the coalition attacks. So we mainly focus on the
security of aggregation algorithm. When attacking the aggre-
gation algorithm, the purpose of an adversary is to forge a
valid aggregate signature while using some invalid individual
signatures. The following is a game played with a challenger
B and an adversary A.
1) Setup: The challenger B runs the setup algorithm
to obtain a master secret key msk and the sys-
tem parameters param with a security parameter l.
Additionally, B randomly generates the public-secret
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key pair (PKcenter, SKcenter) of data center (designated
verifier), then B gives param and PKcenter to A.
2) Queries: An adversary A may access the oracles adap-
tively as follows.
a) KeyGeneration Query OS(ID): On receiving such
a query, challenger B responds by running
KeyGeneration algorithm to obtain the private key
SID of the user ID, returns SID to A.
b) Signing Query Osig(ID, m): On receiving such a
query, challenger B responds by running signing
algorithm to obtain a signature σ and returns σ
to A. (B first runs the KeyGeneration algorithm if
necessary.)
c) AggVerification Query OAggV({mi, IDi, i = 1, . . . ,
n}, σ ): On receiving such a query, challenger
B responds whether the aggregate signature
is valid for the submitting tuples by running
AggVerification algorithm.
3) Forge: Finally, A outputs its forgery
({
mj, IDj, σj, j = 1, . . . , n
}
, σ ∗
)
.
A wins the game if the following conditions are satisfied.
a) The aggregate signature σ ∗ is valid on tuple
{
mj, IDj, σj, j = 1, . . . , n
}
.
b) At least one individual signature σj(j = 1, . . . , n)
is invalid.
This illustrates that A wins the game if and only if it can forge
a valid aggregate signature using a set of individual signatures
which is involved at least one invalid single signature.
Definition 2: An IBAS scheme is (t, )-secure if no t-
time adversary can win the above game with advantage
AdvAggSigA ≥ .
V. OUR IDENTITY-BASED AGGREGATE
SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this section, we provide a secure IBAS scheme. We adopt
Sakai et al.’s [49] signature scheme as the basis to construct
our IBAS scheme. The scheme is described as follows.
A. Setup
Assume l is a security parameter, G1 and G2 are two
cyclic groups of prime order p. Let eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2
be a bilinear pairing, and let P be an arbitrary genera-
tor of G1. H1, H2, and H are full-domain collision resistant
hash functions. H1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1, and H : G2 →
Z∗p . PKG chooses x, y ∈ Z∗p randomly and computes
P0 = xP, PKcenter = yP. Then the system parameters are
param = {eˆ, G1, G2, P, p, H1, H2, H, P0}, the master secret
key is msk = x. The data center’s public-secret verification
key pair is (PKcenter = yP, SKcenter = y).
B. KeyGeneration
Given a sensor node’s identity IDi, compute Qi = H1(IDi)
and the sensor node’s corresponding private key is Si = xQi.
C. Signing
To sign a message mi, the sensor node IDi with the cor-
responding private key Si generates ti ∈ Z∗p randomly, and
computes
Ti = tiP
hi = H2(Ti, IDi, mi)
Ui = Si + tihi.
The signature is σ = (Ui, Ti, IDi, mi).
D. Verification
Given (σ, param), the verifier computes Qi = H1(IDi) and
hi = H2(Ti, IDi, mi), then accepts if the following equation
holds:
eˆ(Ui, P) = eˆ(P0, Qi)eˆ(Ti, hi).
E. Aggregation
Given an aggregate subset of sensor nodes belong to one
cluster, each sensor node with the identity IDi provides a sig-
nature σi = (Ui, Ti, IDi, mi) on a message mi ∈ {0, 1}∗ of its
collection, i = 1, . . . , n. Gained the data center’s public key
PKcenter from public channel, the aggregator computes
r = H(eˆ(U1, PKcenter), . . . , eˆ(Un, PKcenter)
)
U = r ·
n∑
i=1
Ui.
σ = (U, T1, . . . , Tn) is the aggregate signature with identities
{ID1, ID2, . . . , IDn} on messages {m1, m2, . . . , mn}, respec-
tively.
F. AggVerification
Given an aggregate signature σ on the original messages
mi ∈ {0, 1}∗ generated by the sensor nodes belong one cluster
with the identity IDi, i = 1, . . . , n. The data center with public-
secret key pair (PKcenter, SKcenter) computes Qi = H1(IDi)
and hi = H2(Ti, IDi, mi) and accepts if the following equation
holds:
eˆ(U, P) = ni=1eˆ(P0, Qi)r
′
eˆ(Ti, hi)r
′
where
r′ = H(eˆ(P0, Q1)y · eˆ(T1, h1)y, . . . , eˆ(P0, Qn)y · eˆ(Tn, hn)y
)
.
G. Correctness
If the following equations hold:
eˆ(Ui, P) = eˆ(P0, Qi)eˆ(Ti, hi), i = 1, . . . , n.
Then we have
eˆ(Ui, PKcenter) = eˆ(P0, Qi)yeˆ(Ti, hi)y, i = 1, . . . , n
and
r′ = H(eˆ(P0, Q1)yeˆ(T1, h1)y, . . . , eˆ(P0, Qn)yeˆ(Tn, hn)y
)
= H(eˆ(U1, PKcenter), . . . , eˆ(Un, PKcenter)
)
= r.
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Additionally, we have
eˆ(U, P) = eˆ
(
r ·
n∑
i=1
Ui, P
)
= ni=1eˆ(Ui, P)r
= ni=1eˆ(P0, Qi)reˆ(Ti, hi)r
= ni=1eˆ(P0, Qi)r
′
eˆ(Ti, hi)r
′
.
VI. SECURITY PROOF
In this section, first, we give security proof of the above
signature scheme involved in our IBAS scheme in random
oracle model, and then prove the security of the aggregate
algorithm.
Theorem 1: Let H1 and H2 be random oracles and there
exists an adversary A against our scheme with advantage
 when running in time t, making at most dkey times
KeyGeneration queries, ds times signing queries, and di times
random oracle queries to Hi (1 = 1, 2). Then, there exists
an algorithm B to solve the CDH problem with probability
′ ≥ 1d1  and running in time t′ ≤ t+(d1+d2+dkey+4ds)·τsca,
where τsca denotes the time required for computing a scalar
multiplication.
Proof: Assume A can break the EUF-CMA security of
the scheme, then we can construct a CDH problem solver
B who is given a random instance (P, uP, vP) of the CDH
problem. Next, we will show that how B can use A to obtain
the value of uvP in G1.
At the beginning, B sets P0 = uP and generates system
parameters param = {eˆ, G1, G2, P, p, H1, H2, P0}, The hash
functions H1 and H2 serve as random oracles controlled by B.
B chooses a random integer index λ ∈ [1, d1], let the λth query
to H1 is on the target identity ID∗.
B responds to A’s queries as follows. (These queries con-
tain Hi(i = 1, 2) queries, KeyGeneration queries and signing
queries. All pairs of query/answer are maintained in lists.)
A. H1 Queries
B maintains a Hlist1 list of tuples (IDi, h1i, Qi). When
receiving such an query on IDi, B performs the following
steps:
1) if i = λ, B randomly chooses h1i ∈ Z∗q , computes Qi =
H1(IDi) = h1iP;
2) else if i = λ, set h1λ = ⊥, Qλ = vP;
3) add the corresponding tuple to Hlist1 .
We suppose that before making other related queries, A always
makes the corresponding H1 queries first.
B. H2 Queries
B maintains a Hlist2 list of tuples (Ti, IDi, mi, h2i, h2iP).
When receiving an H2 query on (Ti, IDi, mi), B randomly
chooses h2i ∈ Z∗q , computes H2(Ti, IDi, mi) = h2iP, and add
the corresponding tuple to Hlist2 .
C. KeyGeneration Queries
When receiving a KeyGeneration query on an identity IDi:
1) if i = λ, B aborts the game;
2) else, B makes H1 queries on IDi, then searches Hlist1 for
a tuple (IDi, h1i, Qi) and generates the user’s private key
Si = h1iP0.
D. Signing Queries
When receiving a signing query on (IDi, mi):
1) if i = λ, B runs the signing algorithm normally to
produce a signature;
2) if i = λ, B produces a signature in the following way.
a) Randomly pick t1, t2 ∈ Z∗p .
b) Compute T = t1P0, U = t2P0.
c) Set H2(T, ID∗, m) = t−11 (t2P − H1(ID∗)).
If there has been an tuple (T, ID∗, m,⊥) in Hlist2 ,
B chooses another t1 ∈ Z∗p and repeat above three
signature steps.
d) The signature is σ = (U, T, ID, m).
E. Forge
At last, A generates a counterfeit σ ∗ = (U∗, T∗, ID∗, m∗).
If A forges successfully, i.e., σ ∗ is valid, it should pass the
verification
eˆ
(
U∗, P
) = eˆ(P0, Q∗
)
eˆ
(
T∗, h∗2
)
where
Q∗ = H1
(
ID∗
) = vP, h∗2 = H2
(
ID∗, m∗, T∗
)
.
Search the Hlist2 for H2(ID
∗, m∗, T∗) = h2λP. Clearly, B can
transform the above equation into
eˆ
(
U∗, P
) = eˆ(uP, vP)eˆ(T∗, h2λP
)
.
Then, it is easy for B to obtain the CDH solution
uvP = U∗ − h2λ · T∗.
1) Analysis: It is easy for us to obtain the advantage for B
in solving the CDH problem
′ ≥ 1
d1

within time
t′ ≤ t + (d1 + d2 + dkey + 4ds
) · τsca.
Theorem 2: In the above aggregation signature scheme,
suppose H is a collision resistent hash function, we can prove
that the aggregate signature is valid if and only if every
individual signature used in the aggregation is valid.
Proof: If the aggregate signature σ is valid, then the
following equation holds:
eˆ(U, P) = ni=1eˆ(P0, Qi)r
′
eˆ(Ti, hi)r
′
where
r′ = H(eˆ(P0, Q1)yeˆ(T1, h1)y, . . . , eˆ(P0, Qn)yeˆ(Tn, hn)y
)
= H(eˆ(U1, PKcenter), . . . , eˆ(Un, PKcenter)
)
= r.
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TABLE I
DEFINITION OF NOTATIONS IN SECTION VII
The hash function H’s collision resistance implies that
eˆ(Ui, PKcenter) = eˆ(P0, Qi)y · eˆ(Ti, hi)y, i = 1, . . . , n.
Then we can obtain
eˆ(Ui, P) = eˆ(P0, Qi) · eˆ(Ti, hi), i = 1, . . . , n.
This illustrates that every individual signature σi =
(Ui, Ti, IDi, mi) is valid.
More over, if each individual signature used to generate the
aggregate signature is valid, then we have
eˆ
(
Uj, P
) = eˆ(P0, Qj
) · eˆ(Tj, hj
)
, j = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore
eˆ
(
Uj, PKcenter
) = eˆ(P0, Qj
)y · eˆ(Tj, hj
)y
, j = 1, . . . , n
and
r = H(eˆ(U1, PKcenter), . . . , eˆ(Un, PKcenter)
)
= H(eˆ(P0, Q1)yeˆ(T1, h1)y, . . . , eˆ(P0, Qn)yeˆ(Tn, hn)y
)
= r′.
Then we have
eˆ(U, P) = eˆ
(
r ·
n∑
i=1
Ui, P
)
= ni=1eˆ(Ui, P)r
= ni=1eˆ(P0, Qi)reˆ(Ti, hi)r
= ni=1eˆ(P0, Qi)r
′
eˆ(Ti, hi)r
′
.
This indicates that the resulting aggregate signature σ is
valid.
Furthermore
U = r ·
n∑
i=1
Ui
can ensure that the designated verifier (data center) cannot
forge the aggregate signature, since it cannot gain the Ui, i =
1, . . . , n.
The above analysis shows that an aggregate signature is
valid if and only if every individual signature used in the
aggregation algorithm is valid.
2) Observation: Through the above analysis of two theo-
rems, we are able to draw a conclusion that our IBAS scheme
for WSNs is secure and efficient. It can ensure the integrity of
the data and the identity of the sender, can compress multiple
signatures signed by sensor nodes into a short one, and can
reduce the communication and storage cost. So it has a certain
practical value in data aggregation for WSNs.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our IBAS
scheme. We give the description of some notations to be used
in this section in Table I.
A. Comparison of Un-Aggregation and Aggregation Schemes
We give the performance comparison of two versions of
un-aggregation and aggregation schemes in this section, and
un-agg and agg denote the un-aggregation and aggregation
schemes, respectively. We first review the abilities of each
component in our scheme. Sensor node has limited resources
in terms of computation, memory, and battery power, aggre-
gator has a certain ability to calculation and communication
range and it works as a special sensor node, and data cen-
ter has a strong computing power and storage space. So, our
scheme’s objectives are trying to reduce the communication
cost and storage cost of aggregator and sensor node. Without
loss of generality, we assume the aggregator’s identity is IDn
in a cluster which has n sensor nodes {ID1, ID2, . . . , IDn}. The
performance in terms of communication and computation cost
is shown as follows.
1) Communication Cost: The comparison of communica-
tion cost (Table II) indicates that the aggregate scheme can
reduce (n − 1)|G1| transmission in one data aggregation pro-
cess, simultaneously, can reduce (n − 1)|G1| storage cost.
Therefore, our scheme is an efficient data aggregation method
for the WSNs.
2) Computation Cost: Let Pairing, M1, M2, and Exp be the
computation cost of a pairing operation in G2, a scalar multi-
plication calculation in G1, a multiplication calculation in G2,
and an exponentiation operation in G2, respectively. Notice
that the verification equation
eˆ(Ui, P) = eˆ(P0, Qi)eˆ(Ti, hi)
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TABLE II
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF COMMUNICATION COST
TABLE III
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF COMPUTATION COST
TABLE IV
EFFICIENCY COMPARISON OF SOME PAIRING-BASED IBAS SCHEMES
and Ramzan
and the AggVerification equation
eˆ(U, P) = ni=1eˆ(P0, Qi)reˆ(Ti, hi)r
= eˆ
(
P0,
n∑
i=1
Qi
)r
ni=1
(
eˆ(Ti, hi)
)r
=
(
eˆ
(
P0,
n∑
i=1
Qi
)
· (ni=1eˆ(Ti, hi)
))r
here, eˆ(P0, Qi) (i = 1, . . . , n) and eˆ(P0,∑ni=1 Qi) can be pre-
computed. The comparison of computation cost (Table III)
indicates that the aggregate scheme needs more computation
cost, such as more Pairing + M1 + (n + 1)M2 + (n + 1)Exp in
one data aggregation process. The experimental results of [50]
show that a pairing operation cost is far more than others, in
addition, data center has a strong computing power and aggre-
gator has a certain computing ability. So our scheme is feasible
because it is able to reduce (n − 1)|G1| communication and
storage cost during one data aggregation process.
B. Efficiency Comparison
In this section, we give the efficiency comparison of our
CLAS scheme with some existing pairing-based schemes
(Table IV).
Our IBAS scheme and Xu et al.’s scheme [34] just achieve
partial aggregation, then require linear number of pairings,
and ours is needed more pairings in aggregation verifica-
tion process. Gentry and Ramzan [35] had constant number
of pairing operations during the aggregation verification, but,
their scheme has some security weaknesses which have been
reported in [37]. Selvi et al. [37] had a trivial weakness which
is alike to the scheme of [35]. And the signature scheme in [36]
is deterministic, that is to say, the signature generated by a user
on a message remains the same.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Due to the limited resources of sensor nodes in terms of
computation, memory, and battery power, secure and energy-
save data aggregation methods should be designed in WSNs to
reduce the energy cost of data collection, data processing, and
data transmission. In this paper, we present an IBAS scheme
for WSNs, which can compress many signatures generated by
sensor nodes into a short one, i.e., it can reduce the commu-
nication and storage cost. Moreover, we have proved that our
IBAS scheme is secure in random oracle model based on the
CDH assumption, and we also have proved that our aggregate
signature can resist coalition attacks, that is to say the aggre-
gate signature is valid if and only if every single signature
used in the aggregation is valid. In our future work, we will
focus on designing more efficient data aggregation schemes.
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